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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of ethnic divisions on conflict. The analysis relies on
a theoretical model of conflict (Esteban and Ray, 2010) in which equilibrium conflict is
shown to be accurately described by a linear function of just three distributional indices
of ethnic diversity: the Gini coefficient, the Hirschman-Herfindahl fractionalization in-
dex, and a measure of polarization. Based on a dataset constructed by James Fearon
and data from Ethnologue on ethno-linguistic groups and the “linguistic distances” be-
tween them, we compute the three distribution indices. Our results show that ethnic
polarization is a highly significant correlate of conflict. Fractionalization is also signifi-
cant in some of the statistical exercises, but the Gini coefficient never is. In particular,
inter-group distances computed from language and embodied in polarization measures
turn out to be extremely important correlates of ethnic conflict.
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21. Introduction
In this paper we examine the link between different measures of ethnic distribution
and social conflict.
The influence of the Marxian paradigm is clearly perceptible in the traditional view
that income or wealth inequality is a major potential cause of conflict. Early empirical
studies emphasized, accordingly, the personal distribution of income or of wealth in-
dicators such as landownership (see, e.g., Brockett, 1992, Midlarski, 1988, Muller and
Seligson, 1987, Muller et al., 1989, and Nagel, 1974), among several others. However,
as the survey article by Lichbach (1989) concluded, the empirical results obtained were
generally ambiguous, or statistically insignificant.
The emphasis on class differences as a driver of conflict is natural in the sense that
the poor might be reasonably expected to harbor strong antagonisms against the rich.
Yet the existence of antagonisms is only part of the story. The prevalence of sus-
tained conflict requires those antagonisms to be channeled into organized action, often
a tall order when economic strengths are so disparate. The clear economic demarca-
tion across classes is a two-edged sword: while it breeds resentment, the very poverty
of the have-nots militates against a successful insurrection, and even then the differ-
ent skill and occupational niches occupied by capitalist and worker makes effective
redistribution across classes a more indirect and difficult prospect.
In contrast, non-economic markers can be used to separate groups of individuals
that are economically similar, rather than different. Often, the groups who are thus
separated belong to similar niches: they are all workers, or tradesmen, or entrepreneurs
in the same sector. If such markers become focal, the gains from conflict are more
immediate: the losing group can be excluded from the sector in which they directly
compete with the winners. Their very economic similarity ensures that “redistribution”
from one group to the other does not need to be achieved indirectly.2
This leads to a very different view of social conflict. It could emanate from economic
motivations (as in the Marxian paradigm), but find its expression through the divides
generated by non-economic markers, such as religion, ethnicity, or national/local ori-
gins. It could be further exacerbated by hatreds and resentments — perhaps pri-
mordial, perhaps owing to a history of violence — that are attached to the markers
themselves. This is why scholars such as Brubaker and Laitin (1998), examining the
history of internal conflicts in the second half of the twentieth century, are led to
remark on “the eclipse of the left-right ideological axis,” and the “marked ethniciza-
tion of violent challenger-incumbent contests”, while Donald Horowitz observes in his
monumental treatise (Horowitz, 1985), that
“In much of Asia and Africa, it is only modest hyperbole to assert that
the Marxian prophecy has had an ethnic fulfillment.”
2In addition, within-group economic disparities allow the complementary activities of conflict fund-
ing and conflict participation to take place. Esteban and Ray (2008) base a theory of ethnic salience
in conflict on this premise.
3Following Easterly and Levine (1997), economists have also been interested in ethnic
divisions, particularly on the effect of such divisions on levels or rates of growth of per-
capita income, the extent of collective action, or on governance.3 Ethnic “divisions”
were captured by the well-known fractionalization index
F =
m∑
i=1
ni(1− ni),
where ni is the share of the population belonging to group i = 1, ...,m.
This index was then used as an independent variable in different empirical specifica-
tions. Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Miguel et al. (2004)
adopt the same measure as a potential correlate of conflict.4 The connection did not
turn out to be at all strong. For instance, Fearon and Laitin (2003) write that
“The estimates for the effect of ethnic and religious fractionalization are
substantively and statistically insignificant . . . The empirical pattern is
thus inconsistent with . . . the common expectation that ethnic diversity
is a major and direct cause of civil violence.”
Of course, there is no reason why we should have expected a connection in the first
place, even if we were to believe that “ethnic divisions” are connected to conflict. There
is no theoretical basis to the supposition that such “divisions” are best captured by a
measure of fractionalization. It is a measure taken off the shelf, one that happens to
yield the expected results for economic growth or public good provision.
The contribution of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) — MRQ henceforth — is
to empirically examine an alternative measure of “ethnic divisions” that is based on
theory. They draw on two papers by Esteban and Ray (1994, 1999) —ER henceforth—
the first axiomatizing a measure of polarization,5 and the second attempting to relate
polarization to conflict via an explicit behavioral model. Esteban and Ray repeatedly
stress the point that social conflict is driven not just by inter-group differences but by
within-group cohesion, and in so doing they make a case for the family of polarization
measures
Pα =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
n1+αi njdij,
where α has a strictly positive lower bound,6 and {dij} is some measure of inter-group
distances. The existence of α > 0 is testimony to the fact that group sizes matter over
and above the mere counting of individual heads. The latter would happen if α were
3See, e.g., Mauro (1995), Alesina et al. (1999, 2003), and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005).
4See Blattman and Miguel (2010) for an extensive survey that discuses these and related literature.
5Measures of polarization were independently developed by Esteban and Ray (1994) and Wolfson
(1994).
6Esteban and Ray (1994) and Duclos, Esteban and Ray (2004) employ different axioms to get at
the same class of measures but with somewhat different bounds on the value of α.
4zero, leading to the weighted sum of inter-group distances
G =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
ninjdij,
which is the well-known Gini coefficient. The whole point of the polarization exercise
is to stay away from α = 0, and indeed Esteban and Ray (1994, 1999) emphasize the
particular case of α = 1:
P ≡ P1 =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
n2injdij,
which will play a central role in this paper.
In line with P , Reynal-Querol (2002) studied the case in which all inter-group dis-
tances are binary, leading to the following specialization of P :
R =
m∑
i=1
n2i (1− ni).
This is the measure used by MRQ. They show — in an empirical framework very
similar to the ones used by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (2003)
— that R indeed matters for ethnic conflict, while F is not significant. The MRQ
paper is important because it provides the first piece of econometric support for the
proposition that while fractionalization may not matter for conflict, “deep cleavages”
along large group lines — captured by a measure of polarization — might indeed be
important.7
While, as explained, F and R are very different measures of ethnic divisions, they
have an important feature in common. Both measures are based on group sizes alone,
and do not make use of variations in inter-group “distances”. Common sense tells us
— and the model we later develop will make it transparent — that if all groups are
engaged in a contest to seize private divisible resources, then neglecting distances is
indeed the right approach. After all, the contest is a binary question of win or lose.
But groups are not always thus engaged. The contest may be over cultural supremacy,
or ideology, or political power, or the control of an economic sector, or more generally
over the provision of public goods. In that case the identity of the ultimate winner
matters to a losing group, because the “public good” that the winner implements
will generate payoffs to the loser. The degree of such “mattering” can be identified
with a primal notion of distance, though it may be more general than a metric in the
mathematical sense.8
7In this context, it is worth recalling the observation of Horowitz (1985) that “A centrally focused
system [with few groupings] possesses fewer cleavages than a dispersed system, but those it possesses
run through the whole society and are of greater magnitude.”
8Fearon (2003) has already made the point that ethnolinguistic distances may potentially play a
role in explaining ethnic conflict and computed a measure based on dissimilarity between pairs of
languages. MRQ use Fearon’s data to argue that the correlation between G (that uses distances) and
F (that doesn’t) is 0.82. However, Desmet et al. (2009) re-examine this point in a different context:
5This discussion brings us back to the point that most of the literature has been geared
towards finding empirical regularities rather than examining the implications of a fully
specified model of conflict. Should fractionalization enter the empirical specification?
When should we employ the Gini, or polarization, or yet some other measure of ethnic
distribution? When should we use distances? Theory should inform these choices.
There is an additional reason for using a fully-developed model, which is that it
assists us in the specification and interpretation of an empirical relationship. As an
example of the role played by structural constraints, recall the argument of MRQ which
shows that not only are R and F conceptually different, they are very different in the
data. A scatterplot of R on F shows that the former is empirically related to the latter
in inverse-U form (Figures 1–3, MRQ, p. 802–3). But, of course, if one posits that
RQ is a quadratic function of F , one obtains extremely high correlations. It follows
that if there is no structural reason to discard a nonlinear relationship, we should
conclude that their result that R, not F , is significant for explaining the incidence
of conflict, could be upturned had we explained conflict by means of a second degree
polynomial function of fractionalization instead. Without a theoretical model that
establishes structural constraints on the equation to be estimated, there seems to be a
very modest scope for progress.
With these remarks as background, we turn to a summary of our paper. We build on
a general model of conflict developed in Esteban and Ray (2010). In this framework,
there is conflict over the control of resources by one of several ethnic groups. The
winner in that conflict obtains two sorts of prizes (the ratio between the two prizes
is a parameter of the model). First, the winner gets to “produce” a mix of public
“goods” — access to an economic sector or a housing market, religious or cultural
norms, political power that benefits its own ethnicity. Second, the winner simply gets
a divisible resource which can be privately consumed by group members.
A key idea behind this specification is that with private resources, a losing group
obtains a payoff that is independent of the identity of the winner.9 With public goods
to be produced, the identity of the winner matters to the loser and precipitates a
notion of “distance” across groups. A second crucial difference between the private-
and public-goods cases is that the per-capita payoff in the former depends on group
size (the prize needs to be divided up), while no such effect exists for public goods.
Esteban and Ray prove that the equilibrium intensity of conflict can be proxied
by a linear function of exactly three indices: F , G, and P , where G and P embody
“distances” dij that are defined by the public goods utility loss to group i should
group j win the contest. In particular, the structural feature of the model rules out
any specification that is nonmonotonic in F , thereby taking care of the critique in the
example discussed above.
the level of social transfers in ethnically heterogeneous societies. They find that the measures that
include distances outperform the ones that don’t. Specifically, they obtain that G is significant while
F isn’t and that the same is true for P relative to R.
9Sheer resentment at a particular group grabbing the spoils can be viewed as part of the public
component of the price.
6As we show below and explain in some detail, the weights in the linear expression
depend on two fundamental characteristics of the model: the degree of publicness in
the group’s objectives and level of commitment to the group vis-a-vis the self. These
coefficients, once estimated, give us an indirect indication of the role of publicness and
the extent of group cohesion in individual behavior.
To estimate the model, the empirical exercise must necessarily make use of inter-
group distances, capturing the payoff losses across the different type of public goods
preferred by each group.10 There are two basic difficulties in obtaining such mea-
sures of distance. First, we do not have concrete data on what these preferences are,
though such an exercise is not beyond the realm of possibility.11 The second difficulty
is more fundamental. A direct elicitation of inter-group preferences would necessarily
be plagued by endogeneity. It is reasonable and entirely likely that two groups affected
by a long history of conflict will have developed preferences that lead to sizable “dis-
tances”. There is little doubt that measures based on such distances will show large
correlations with conflict, but there is little hope of interpreting those coefficients from
any causal perspective.12
We must therefore trade off an “accurate” description of preferences for something
that is a good proxy, and yet possesses a reasonable degree of exogeneity with respect
to current conflicts. Following Fearon (2003) and Desmet et al. (2009, 2010), we use
linguistic distances across groups as (linear) proxies for the utility losses. We measure
the similarity of languages by the relative number of shared branches on the language
tree they inhabit (more below) and attempt to capture “cultural” differences over
public goods by the degree of linguistic dissimilarity (one minus the resemblance).
We use two different data sources. One is the data compiled by Fearon (2003) for
every country: he identifies distinct groups by aggregating across communities with
little or no linguistic differences, though these aggregations are qualified and informed
by other criteria, mainly religion.13 The second source is the inventory of the different
linguistic groups at the most disaggregated level possible furnished by the Ethnologue
project.14 This permits us to compute distributional measures that depend on inter-
group distances, such as G or P , using the two alternative sources of data.
A second distinctive feature of our exercise is that we are interested in the intensity
of conflict, and not just a binary indicator of whether or not society is in some state
10Easterly and Levine (1997), Alesina et al. (1999) or Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) assume that
ethnic groups differ on the preferences over the public goods to be supplied. However, these papers
do not attempt to measure the distance in preferences across ethnic groups.
11For instance, an appropriate calibration of the answers to some of the questions in the World
Values Survey could give us a some purchase on the problem.
12That said, we must note that a similar endogeneity problem is present in the very classification
of ethnic groups. Perhaps certain ethnic divisions are made salient by the existence of conflict, which
forces us, the researchers, to create separate ethnic categories. Below, we attempt to avoid this
problem in our robustness checks.
13We are in fact using an updated version graciously made available to us by James Fearon.
14See details at www.ethnologue.com.
7of turmoil. The literature that we’ve referred to has often focused on the existence
(or otherwise) of civil war in a particular time period. Certain criteria are used to
determine this, the most important of which is the use of various threshold levels of
annual deaths (see, e.g., Small and Singer, 1982, Licklider, 1993, Doyle and Sambanis,
2000, Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Some of our specifications use this standard approach,
to aid comparison. In other specifications we attempt to smooth out the binary de-
scription. We combine different thresholds for civil war used by the Peace Research
Institute of Oslo (PRIO) to arrive at a dependent variable with four-step intensity in
conflict. We also use the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS), which
generates a continuous index of social conflict by using a weighted combination of sev-
eral indicators, including political assassinations, demonstrations, strikes, and political
prisoners. Apart from providing a continuous measure of social unrest, as opposed to
using invariably questionable thresholds to divide peace from war, this index has the
added virtue of not restricting attention to civil war alone.
Our empirical exercise estimates the model by Esteban and Ray (2010) using the
controls standard in the literature. Our basic result is that the polarization measure
P is highly significant, the significance of the fractionalization index F is fragile, as
it greatly depends on the specification of the model, and that the Gini index is never
significant.
The theory allows us to interpret these coefficients to some degree. The fact that
P is significant suggests that disputes over public goods, broadly defined, is invariably
a feature of social conflicts. Such public goods could be narrowly economic, such as
access to a particular trade or a labor market, or they could be of broader scope,
such as political power or cultural dominance. The fact that F is generally significant
suggests that divisible pecuniary benefits also play a role in conflict, though as we’ve
mentioned the significance of F is not as ubiquitous as that of P .
The lack of significance of the Gini coefficient has a more subtle interpretation. It
suggests that free-rider problems in conflict are not as important as we might make
them out to be. As we shall argue, this lack of significance (together with the impor-
tance of P ) suggests that behavior in conflict may be notably driven by concern for
the fate of the group, rather than by immediate personal interest.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe and give the intuition
for the main proposition in Esteban and Ray (2010). Section 3 provides a detailed
discussion of how the different variables have been computed and the data sources
that have been used. The variables and controls used in the empirical exercise are
fully listed in an Appendix. The main empirical results are presented in Section 4.
Section 5 is devoted to various robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.
2. Theory
The conceptual background for this paper is based on Esteban and Ray (1999, 2010).
They describe a theoretical framework for conflict in which familiar distributional
measures play a central role.
8There are m groups, with Ni the number of individuals in group i, and N the total
population. The groups are fighting to control society.15 Control brings with it two
prizes, the relative magnitudes of which will be of interest to us.
One is a public prize: political control, economic policy (such as protectionism versus
liberalization), education, cultural values, and so on. The winning group will get to
choose these policies or public goods. The other groups may still derive utility from
these choices, depending on “how far away” they are from the winning group. We
model attitudes to public goods in the following way. A typical member of group i
enjoys some exogenous payoff uij if the ideal policy of group j is chosen. This induces
a notion of “distance” across different groups i and j:
(1) dij ≡ uii − uij,
which is just the loss faced by each individual in group i if group j’s policy is imple-
mented.
The other prize is private: economic goods that can be seized and consumed. These
benefits can be access to positions in the public administration, tax cuts [when the
groups specialize in different occupations], allocation of licenses, and the like. Private-
ness has two important properties. First, the goods are divided up among the members
of the winning group, so that as in Olson (1971), group size matters in the enjoyment
of the prize. Second, the identity of the winning group is entirely irrelevant to any of
the losers. There are no “distances” with private goods.16
We will need to carry some notion of the relative importance of the two prizes. We
do this by assigning a weight λ per-capita to the public prize, which we use to scale
all the public payoffs uij, and a corresponding weight of 1−λ per capita to the private
prize.
Individuals in each group expend resources r (time, money, effort) to influence the
final outcome. Write the cost to such expenditure as c(r); assume that c is increasing,
smooth, and strictly convex, with c′(0) = 0.17 Add individual contributions over each
group i to obtain group contribution Ri. We presume that the probability of success
for group i is given by
pi =
Ri
RN
where RN ≡
∑
iRi.
18 The value ρ = RN/N is per-capita expenditure in society as a
whole; this is the measure of conflict.
15In this exercise, we do not model the decision to engage in conflict, and simply presume that
society is in a state of (greater or lesser) turmoil. For explicit models of the decision to enter into
conflict, see Esteban and Ray (2007, 2008) and Ray (2009).
16If there are, such as differential degrees of anger over the identity of the winner, we simply include
these components under the first of the two prizes.
17To obtain a unique equilibrium ER also assume c′′′(r) ≥ 0. We will not be concerned with exis-
tence and uniqueness in this exposition, and in particular we won’t stay away from the interpretation
that c could be “close to” linear.
18If RN = 0, use an arbitrary allocation of win probabilities.
9The “direct” payoff, then, to an individual in group i who expends resources r is
given by
(2) pi
(1− λ)
ni
−
m∑
j=1
pjλdij − c(r),
where ni ≡ Ni/N is the population share of group i. The first term is the expected
payoff from the private good. The second term is the expected payoff from the public
good, expressed using the losses or distances. The last term is the resource cost.
The model is closed by presuming that every individual has an “extended utility
function” (as in Sen, 1966) which places a weight of 1−α on direct payoffs, as described
in (2), and a weight of α on group payoffs, obtained as the group aggregate of all
payoffs in (2). As ER observe, the weight α could (but needn’t) be interpreted as
altruism or concern: α is some reduced-form measure of the extent to which within-
group monitoring, possibly along with promises and threats, manages to overcome the
free-rider problem of individual contributions.
A simple manipulation shows that for individual k member of group i the maximiza-
tion of the extended payoff is equivalent to the maximization of
[(1− α) + αNi]
[
pi
1− λ
ni
+ λ
m∑
j=1
pjuij
]
− c(ri)− α
∑
`∈i;`6=k
c(ri(`))
with respect to ri(k). Recalling our definition of “distance” from i to j: dij ≡ uii−uij,
we define (for every i and j) ∆ii ≡ 0, and ∆ij ≡ λdij + (1− λ)/ni for all j 6= i, and let
σi ≡ (1− α) + αNi. Then our individual equivalently chooses ri(k) to maximize
−σi
m∑
j=1
pj∆ij − c(ri(k)).
The solution to this maximization problem is completely described by the interior
first-order condition:
(3)
σi
R
m∑
j=1
pj∆ij = c
′(ri(k))
An equilibrium of this model is just a Nash equilibrium across all contributions
{ri(k)}, for each group i and every individual k ∈ i. It generates per-capita conflict,
measured by ρ = RN/N . This value will be related to the data of the problem,
summarized by
(a) group population shares (ni), as well as total population N ;
(b) inter-group “distances” {dij}, as in (1);
(c) the importance of the public good λ; and
(d) the parameter on extended utility, α.
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To state ER’s main result, define γi ≡ pi/ni for every group i. This is a measure
of how group win probabilities depart from their demographic share. The ratio γi is
exactly 1 when there is no such departure. Define
(4) φ(γi, γj, ρ) ≡ c
′(ρ)γiγj
c′(γiρ)
.
for every i and j, and observe that φ(1, 1, ρ) = 1 for every ρ > 0.
We impose the following computational simplification:
[A] Neglect the discrepancy between win probabilities and demographic shares by
setting φ(γi, γj, ρ) ' 1 for every i and j.
Proposition 1 (Esteban and Ray, 2010). Under the computational simplification [A],
equilibrium per-capita conflict ρ is approximately determined as follows:
(5) ρc′(ρ) = ω1 + ω2G+ α[λP + (1− λ)F ],
where
G is the Gini coefficient using distances (dij):
G =
m∑
j=1
m∑
i=1
ninjdij;
P is the squared measure of polarization from the Esteban-Ray family of polarization
measures, again using distances (dij):
P =
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
n2injdij;
F is the Hirschman-Herfindahl fractionalization index:
F =
m∑
i=1
ni(1− ni);
and the weights in (5) are given by ω1 ≡ (1− λ)(1−α)(m− 1)/N , ω2 ≡ λ(1−α)/N .
Under the computational simplification [A], the theory yields a remarkable connec-
tion between conflict — or rather, some transform of its disutility — and just three
distributional measures. ER go on to argue, using both analytical and numerical meth-
ods, that despite the computational simplification the formula (5) yields an accurate
approximation for “true”, i.e., equilibrium, conflict. We do not repeat these arguments
here, but simply take equation (5) as a starting point for our analysis.
The weights associated to the three distributional measures depend on the degree
of publicness of the prize, as captured by λ, the level of intra-group cohesion, as
described by α, and overall population. Moreover, as population grows, the weight
on the “intercept term” as well as the Gini coefficient converges to zero. Conflict is
11
proxied by a convex combination of polarization and fractionalization, no matter what
the value of cohesion, as long as the latter is positive.
To understand why ER get the combination they do, begin by thinking about pure
public goods. From the vantage point of a single member of group i and just two groups
i and j, the severity of the tussle at hand is roughly proportional to the potential loss
∆ij that our individual will suffer if group j wins, times the threat posed by group j
(proxied by demographic share nj). At the same time, the potency or impact of an
individual contribution is roughly of the order of N−1, where N is overall population.
It stands to reason, then, that the (disutility of the) individual’s contribution will be
related to nj∆ij/N .
Consequently, the total population-normalized contributions made by everyone from
group i is proportional to
(6) ninj∆ij/N.
The expression (6) is all we need for an intuitive understanding of the proposition. If,
for instance, individuals feel no extended utility and all goods are public, then ∆ij is
just dij, and adding all the expression in (6) over all groups i and j, we get∑
i
∑
j
ninjdij/N = G/N,
which explains why the Gini coefficient enters, but in progressively weaker form as
population becomes large.
Continuing with public goods, we see that with fully extended utility (α = 1), our
individual effectively internalizes the potential loss to everyone in her group, not just
herself. So the potential loss at hand is ∆ij = Nidij. Using this in (6), the total
population-normalized contribution from group i is ninjNidij/N = n
2
injdij, and added
over all groups we get ∑
i
∑
j
n2injdij = P,
which is the squared polarization measure from the Esteban-Ray family. For the special
case in which all groups are indifferent over the public goods other than their own, we
should have dij = 1, i 6= j, and dii = 0, for all i. In this case, P reduces to the measure
R, proposed by Reynal-Querol (2002).
With private prizes at stake, and no extended utility, replace ∆ij by 1/ni in the
expression (6); once added over all groups one obtains a constant (intercept) term that
vanishes with N . Finally, with extended utility, replace ∆ij by Ni/ni in (6), which
gives us just ninj. Adding over all groups yields the fractionalization index.
This explains why polarization and fractionalization have the relative weights de-
scribed in Proposition 1, why the two measures make an appearance only in the pres-
ence of extended utility, and why the weight on the Gini coefficient is attenuated by
population size.
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3. Empirical Implementation: Data and Conceptual Issues
Our goal is to regard (5) in Proposition 1 seriously, and take it to the data.
In order to interpret equation (5) we observe that the payoff (2) is expressed in terms
of the private good, “income”. Consequently, the terms dij are the income equivalent
of the loss experienced from obtaining public good j instead of i, the most preferred
one. Likewise, c(r) is the income equivalent of contributing a level r of effort to conflict
[for instance, we can think of r as time devoted to conflict activities]. Notice now that
c′(r) —the marginal cost of conflict— also is the marginal rate of substitution between
effort and income. Therefore, we can interpret ρc′(ρ) as the value in income of the
resources contributed by an individual contributing ρ, and using c′(ρ) as the “shadow
price” of the effort wasted in conflict. On the RHS of (5) we have a linear function of
the three distributional indices, G,F, and P , where the terms dij are to be interpreted
as income equivalent of inter-group distances.
We start by examining the possible indicators for the value of the resources wasted
in conflict and then deal with the measurement of group size and inter-group distances
needed to compute the distributional indices.
3.1. Conflict. Most cross country empirical studies on conflict use the data on in-
cidence and onset from the UCDP/PRIO dataset.19 We shall also make use of this
data.20 We are consequently assuming that a larger per capita expenditure in conflict
activities produces a higher incidence of conflict, or frequency of onset.
PRIO considers a country to be in a state of conflict when one of the warring
parties is the incumbent government and the number of human casualties goes beyond
a threshold level within a given time period. All such observations would be cases of
incidence. A case of conflict onset is more demanding: the observation in question
would have to be deemed the start of a “fresh episode” of conflict. The literature has
been interested in both these variables, and in our exercise we shall consider either
form as well.
The PRIO dataset considers three threshold levels that define higher and higher
intensities of conflict: low conflict (prio25), intermediate conflict (priocw), and war
(prio1000). The precise definitions are as follows:
prio25: between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year.
priocw: more than 25 battle-related deaths per year and a total conflict history of
more than 1000 battle-related deaths, but fewer than 1000 per year.
19This is a joint dataset of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Department of
Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University and the Centre for the Study of Civil War at the
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO). It is available at http://www.prio.no/Data/.
See Gleditsch et al. (2002) for a presentation of the dataset and the relevant definitions.
20Correlates of War (COW) is an alternative dataset. It has been used by Collier and Hoefller
(2002), Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Doyle and Sambanis (2000). Yet, as discussed in Sarkees et
al. (2003) the data in COW have three limitations: (i) they are less transparent and reliable than
UCDP/PRIO, (ii) the data run till 1990, and (iii) the dataset does not include most post-communist
countries. Nevertheless, the correlation with UCDP/PRIO at country-year level is 0.66–0.75.
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prio1000: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year.
For the recording of conflict incidence, we divide our time span into five year periods
and presume that a country displays conflict activity of a given level if in any of the
years within that period the corresponding threshold condition has been met.21 We
start by following the literature in considering just this dichotomous peace-war variable.
We run the exercise for all three threshold levels as a robustness check.
As for conflict onset, we follow the PRIO convention and define an onset year to be
one in which there have been more than 25 battle-related deaths and at least a certain
number of consecutive years before that were incidence-free. This number is taken
to be two (onset2), at least five previous years of peace (onset5), or at least eight
previous years of peace (onset8). As in the case of incidence, we employ specifications
for all three alternative definitions of onset.
The previous measures of conflict can be questioned because our model suggests
that the dependent variable should reflect different intensities of conflict. We tackle
this problem from two angles. First, using the same dataset as above, we construct a
discrete variable of intensity depending on whether the country is below the threshold
prio25, below priocw, below prio1000 or above that level, recorded as 0, 1, 2, 3,
respectively. We test the model using this four-step intensity variable.
Our second approach goes a step further. It takes care of the potential objection
that the PRIO measures are exclusively based on the number of battle deaths, and that
we miss other forms of social conflict (such as assassinations) that may not qualify as
“battle-related”. We take as such an indicator the continuous index of social conflict,
isc, as computed by the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS). It provides
a measure of the level of social unrest with no need to define a questionable threshold
dividing “peace” from “war”. The index isc is formed by taking a weighted average
over eight different manifestations of internal conflict: Assassinations, General Strikes,
Guerrilla Warfare, Major Government Crises, Purges, Riots, Revolutions, and Anti-
Government Demonstrations, adopted from Rummel (1963). For details of variables
and weights, see the Appendix.
We shall take the value of this continuous index of conflict as our dependent variable,
thus assuming that this value is proportional to the monetary value of the per capita
resources employed.22
3.2. Distributional Indices. Our core independent variables are the three indices,
G, F , and P . As already noted in Proposition 1 and discussed in detail following that
proposition, the index G enters the model divided by total population, N . In line with
that specification, we use G/N rather than G as the regressor.23
21We note with some misgivings that the PRIO thresholds are not normalized by the population
of the country in question, which undoubtedly biases civil wars in favor of large countries. The
population control in our exercises should take care of this problem.
22The correlation between isc and priocw is 0.45.
23We express N in millions.
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In order to compute our indices we need the size of the relevant groups for every
country and a proxy for the “distance” in preferences across groups.
3.2.1. Groups. We base our analysis on the data generously furnished by James Fearon.
This data set is an update of the earlier contribution in Fearon (2003), which identifies
“culturally distinct” groups in 160 countries. Fearon uses various sources standard
in the literature and combines them with complementary information about religious
groups and other relevant potential social cleavages.
It can be argued that there is potential endogeneity in such a procedure. Yet the
cases of Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, in which there is full homogeneity in language, or
of Papua, where no linguistic group reaches 1% of the population, clearly suggest that
the definition of the “relevant” ethnic groups demands careful but active intervention
by the researcher. We adopt Fearon’s dataset because we are persuaded that it is the
best available.
At the same time, in order to check for the robustness of our results, we go to
the other extreme. We work with entirely ungrouped raw information on the size of
different linguistic groups — and linguistic groups alone —provided by Ethnologue.24
It retains the information on languages at its maximum level of detail. The Ethnologue
project lists 6,912 known living languages and gives the population sizes that use each
language in each country. Speaking a different language certainly sets a barrier with
one’s neighbor and can be considered a sound base for differences in preferences for
public goods. In this case, we take the linguistic groups as the relevant ethnic groups,
with no aggregation of the raw data at all.
3.2.2. Preferences and Distances. Next comes the construction of inter-group distances.
Ideally, as discussed in Section 2, we would like to have preferences over public goods.
We do not have concrete data on what these preferences are, though this may not be
an impossibility. More important, a direct elicitation of such preferences would neces-
sarily be plagued by endogeneity: two conflictual groups are likely to have generated
sizable inter-group “distances” in their attitudes.
We therefore use as a proxy the “cultural” distances computed by Fearon (2003) and
Desmet et al. (2009, 2010). The basic information derives from the linguistic distance
between any two groups. Following Greenberg (1956), Fearon and Laitin (1999, 2000),
Laitin (2000) and Fearon (2003), we shall use the linguistic distance between two
groups as an appropriate indicator for their difference in preferences over public goods.
The different languages spoken can be organized in a language tree capturing their
genealogy. All Indo-European languages, for instance, will belong to a common subtree.
Subsequent splits will create futher “sub-subtrees” until we reach the current language
map.25 Ethnologue reports a maximum of fifteen steps of branching in the tree of all
24The information from Ethnologue has already been used for the analysis of conflict by Fearon
(2003), Alesina et al. (2003), and Desmet et al. (2009, 2010).
25For instance, Spanish and Basque diverge at the first branch, since they come from structurally
unrelated language families. By contrast, the Spanish and Catalan branches share their first 7
15
laguages, though of course, not all modern language families hit this upper bound
along their own evolutionary branch.26
The distance between two “cultures” can be approximated by how far from each
other on the tree their two languages are. Specifically, define the similarity between two
languages i and j, sij, as the ratio of the number of common branches to the maximum
possible number— fifteen when we consider the entire tree.27 Then, following Fearon
(2003) and Desmet et al. (2009), we define the distance between between the two
languages, κij, as κij = 1− sδij, for some parameter δ ∈ (0, 1].
There appear to be no compelling arguments for choosing a particular value of δ.
While Fearon computes linguistic distances using δ = 0.5, Desmet et al. (2009, 2010)
use δ = 0.05. We shall take δ = 0.5 as a base, but will also compute distances using
δ = 0.05 and δ = 1. In our empirical exercise we shall be implicitly assuming that the
distance in preferences dij is proportional to κij and hence will obtain G and P using
these intergroup distances.
Fearon’s aggregated ethnic-religious groups may contain subgroups speaking differ-
ent languages. In such a case, he takes as the representative language the one spoken by
the largest subgroup. This language is then used to compute the inter-group linguistic
distances.28
Summing up, our baseline is Fearon’s estimate of the size of the different ethnic
groups in the 160 countries he considers, together with his ethnolinguistic distances
using δ = 0.5. With this information we compute G, F , and P for every country. As
robustness checks, we also use the values 0.05 and 1 for δ. In addition, we contrast
our results recomputing the distributional parameters under the assumption that each
language constitutes a “group” and using the group sizes supplied by Ethnologue, with
δ = 0.05 as in Desmet et al. (2009).
3.3. Additional Controls. We use a set of controls that are usually considered in
these exercises. In all the specifications, while the dependent variable is the incidence
of conflict in each period, the control variables refer to the first year of each period.
The control variables are population (pop), GDP per capita (gdp), dependence on
oil exports (oil), the percentage of mountainous terrain (mount), a dummy variable
for noncontiguity of country territory (ncontig), and another dummy for democracy
(dem). The justification for each of these controls can be found elsewhere (Fearon and
Laitin, 2003, Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, 2008, Miguel et al., 2004, MRQ). Each control
nodes: Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian and Ibero-Romance
languages.
26The interested reader can find a detailed discussion of the construction of the language tree in
Desmet et al. (2009).
27If two groups speak the same language, sij is set to 1.
28One can argue that the coexistence of various languages within a group might weaken its capacity
to produce effective collective action or to achieve agreement on which public goods to demand. We
leave this issue for future research.
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has been of intrinsic interest in at least one contribution, so we report control coeffi-
cients in each specification. In a later set of variations, we include regional dummies
for Latin America, Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.
A full list of the additional controls is included in the Appendix.
4. Empirical Results: Ethnic Groups and Conflict
In this section we estimate the model implied by equation (5). Our sample includes
131 countries over the period 1960–2008. As mentioned before, this sample has been
divided into five-year sub-periods, with the exception of the last one, 2005–2008, which
only contains four years. This gives us a total of 1,174 observations. We begin with a
benchmark specification of the dependent and independent variables and then proceed
to examine several variations.
In our benchmark exercise, the dependent variable is priocw and the independent
variablesG/N , P and F are computed from Fearon’s updated dataset. Reynal-Querol’s
binary variant on P is included in some of the exercises. A full set of controls is present
in each specification.
We are interested in estimating the model
ρc′(ρ)it = X1iβ1 +X2itβ2 + εit, i = 1, ..., C, t = 1, . . . , T ,
where X1i contains the relevant distributional indices and X2i the controls, εit is an
innovation with symmetric pdf, and C and T are the numbers of countries and time
periods respectively.
Clearly, we do not observe ρc′(ρ)it. We therefore interpret the previous equation as
a latent variable model. So we presume that
(7) P (priocwit = 1|Xit) = P (ρc′(ρ) > W ∗|Xit) = H(Xitβ −W ∗)
where Xit = (X1i, X2it), W
∗ is a threshold that plays the role of an intercept in H, β is
the vector that contains the coefficients of interest and H is the cumulative distribution
function of εit.
Table 1 reports our baseline results of estimating (7). Columns 1–6 present the
estimated coefficients obtained using maximum likelihood in a logit model.29
In all cases, we compute p-values using standard errors robust to within-country cor-
relation and heteroskedasticity. These are reported in parentheses below the estimated
coefficients.
29We have also used a probit model and have obtained identical results.
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Table 1. Baseline
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P 11.445
(0.001)
10.073
(0.011)
8.183
(0.033)
10.336
(0.002)
F 1.424
(0.071)
1.617
(0.010)
0.751
(0.349)
1.223
(0.152)
0.759
(0.352)
1.037
(0.159)
G/N −5.851
(0.110)
−5.409
(0.117)
R 8.916
(0.014)
2.444
(0.550)
4.032
(0.335)
LGDPC −0.575
(0.016)
−0.456
(0.024)
−0.628
(0.003)
−0.605
(0.007)
−0.646
(0.003)
−0.602
(0.009)
LPOP 0.184
(0.282)
0.380
(0.002)
0.425
(0.000)
0.211
(0.195)
0.407
(0.001)
0.387
(0.001)
OIL 0.708
(0.135)
0.831
(0.070)
0.726
(0.110)
0.691
(0.141)
0.677
(0.145)
0.704
(0.134)
MOUNT 0.007
(0.351)
0.016
(0.018)
0.011
(0.132)
0.006
(0.397)
0.010
(0.201)
0.011
(0.144)
NONCONT 1.264
(0.026)
0.901
(0.066)
1.129
(0.029)
1.281
(0.024)
1.264
(0.028)
1.235
(0.034)
DEM −0.247
(0.405)
−0.151
(0.608)
−0.227
(0.446)
−0.253
(0.396)
−0.235
(0.430)
−0.215
(0.468)
CONST −1.772
(0.506)
−5.576
(0.009)
−5.600
(0.014)
−2.093
(0.437)
−5.157
(0.028)
−5.000
(0.029)
Pseudo-R2 0.217 0.168 0.191 0.218 0.208 0.205
Est.method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit
Countries 131 131 131 131 131 131
Observations 1174 1174 1174 1174 1174 1174
Notes: The dependent variable is PRIOCW. P-values are reported in
brackets. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering have been
employed to compute z-statistics.
Column 1 contains our basic specification with the distributional indices P , F and
G/N . P has the expected positive coefficient and is significant (at the 1% level). The
coefficient associated with F is also positive and significant (at the 10% level or better).
In contrast, G/N is not significant. Moreover, in line with a common result in all the
literature on conflict with cross-country data, per-capita income is significantly and
negatively related to conflict.30
In order to put this result into perspective, we reproduce Fearon and Laitin (2003)
and MRQ exercises with our dataset in columns 2 and 3, respectively. We find that F
is highly significant, unlike Fearon and Laitin. This result, while of intrinsic interest in
guiding our interpretation of the parameters (see below), is at odds with the findings
in the literature. However, as we shall see, its significance is quite fragile as it critically
depends on the particular specification of the model and/or on the definition of conflict
being used.
30We have also examined the effect of income inequality. Using the Gini of personal incomes as a
regressor has no effect neither on the value of the coefficient corresponding to P nor on its significance,
always at 1%.
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In column 3 we follow MRQ and add R as a regressor. In line with their results,
here too R is indeed highly significant while F stops being so.
This raises the question of whether distances matter at all, once a binary measure
of polarization such as R is in place. To explore this matter along with that of the
significance of F , we run a new specification in which R is introduced as an additional
regressor along with all our existing distributional indices. The results are reported
in column 4. The distance-based polarization measure P continues to be highly sig-
nificant, while the newly-introduced R is not. At the same time, the presence of R
destroys the significance of F , in line with the findings of MRQ. It is worth noticing
that the correlation between R and F is quite high, 0.51. This may induce considerable
collinearity between these variables that might explain this outcome.31
In our baseline exercise reported in column 1 we have found that G/N was not sig-
nificant. We now reestimate the model by removing the Gini index from the regression.
Columns 5 and 6 display the corresponding results, with and without R, respectively.
Removing G/N only from the regression —column 5— we obtain that, while R and F
are not significant, P is highly so.
Finally, in column 6 we exclude both G/N and R. We observe that this does not
have any impact on either the estimated value of P or on its significance, which remains
high. In contrast, the significance of F disappears —as compared with the result in
column 1. This result mirrors the one reported by MRQ, where they found that R was
significant while F was not, in a specification very similar to the one presented here
(we use P instead of R).
If we believe the theory summarized in Proposition 1, it is possible to provide an
interpretation for the estimated parameters. Our results show that the coefficient
obtained for G/N is not significantly different from zero. This means that λ(1 − α)
should be very close to zero, where it will be recalled that λ ∈ [0, 1] is the publicness
of the prize and α ∈ [0, 1] the extent of group cohesion.
At the same time, we see that P is highly significant — at a level well below 1% in
most of the specifications. That suggests that λ is significantly positive.
Combining these two pieces of information, we must conclude that α ' 1, indicating
that models of free-riding are less relevant than we make them out to be, at least in
the cases of collective action in the civil conflicts that we are considering.
Focusing on the estimated coefficients for F and P , we observe that the coefficient
of F is not always significant. The non-significance of F , coupled with the high sig-
nificance of P , implies that there is (at least) an important component of publicness
in the winner’s return to conflict. Whether that component is economic (control of
a labor or housing market, or a trade), cultural (the establishment of some notion of
ideological or religious superiority) or political (control of the state) is something we
cannot identify; all we can say is that it is central to conflict. At the same time, the
31This correlation is even higher in MRQ’s dataset, where it is equal to 0.61.
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fact that F is significant in some of the specifications suggests that private benefits
could also play a role.32
Stepping back and returning to the strong significance achieved by P , we might think
— as Esteban and Ray (1994) did — that there are two distributional features that are
relevant for conflict. One is the sense of group identity, captured here by an increasing
function of group size. To be sure, this effect is nonmonotonic: it kicks in only when
other sizable groups are present. The second is “alienation” across groups, measured
by inter-group distances. The polarization measures P and R are both sensitive to
identity, while F and G are not. Indeed, P and R were deliberately constructed to
deal with group size, as well as the possible nonmonotonicity alluded to above. On the
other hand, G and P are sensitive to alienation, while F and R are not. The fact that
P is highly significant, and in such a dominant way, means that identity and alienation
are jointly and synergistically responsible for conflict.
We reiterate that our operative implementation of alienation is not remotely con-
nected with current antagonisms. Such an approach would be immediately vulnerable
to claims of endogeneity. We simply stick to language “distances”. In this light, the
connections appear remarkable.
5. Variations
In this section we explore the robustness of the previous results to (a) alternative
definitions of the dependent variable, (b) other sources of linguistic compositions and
distances, (c) other estimation strategies and (d) the possible existence of regional and
time effects.
5.1. Other Definitions of Conflict. We begin by checking the robustness of the
previous exercise to the use of other definitions of the conflict variable. Recall that the
baseline specification uses a binary variable, depending on whether a particular thresh-
old for yearly battle deaths has been crossed. Moreover, we study conflict incidence
rather than onset.
32This interpretation might be relevant to the discussion of the role of greed versus grievance as
motivations for ethnic conflict pioneered by Collier and Hoeffler, see Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and
— more recently — Collier et al. (2009).
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Table 2. Other deffinition of conflict
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
P 11.445
(0.001)
9.307
(0.000)
13.555
(0.000)
4.607
(0.008)
5.136
(0.002)
4.228
(0.007)
9.742
(0.001)
3.107
(0.048)
F 1.424
(0.071)
1.517
(0.020)
0.808
(0.325)
1.262
(0.006)
0.640
(0.144)
0.671
(0.130)
1.317
(0.047)
0.345
(0.321)
G/N −5.851
(0.110)
−3.069
(0.084)
−8.302
(0.104)
−1.720
(0.105)
−1.171
(0.221)
−9.421
(0.281)
−3.461
(0.072)
−0.378
(0.497)
LGDPC −0.575
(0.016)
−0.682
(0.000)
−0.887
(0.000)
−0.408
(0.001)
−0.428
(0.000)
−0.474
(0.000)
−0.640
(0.000)
−0.453
(0.000)
LPOP 0.184
(0.282)
0.187
(0.168)
−0.009
(0.958)
0.060
(0.523)
0.049
(0.563)
0.046
(0.589)
0.155
(0.216)
0.219
(0.000)
OIL 0.708
(0.135)
0.724
(0.089)
0.681
(0.151)
0.939
(0.001)
0.633
(0.004)
0.727
(0.001)
0.675
(0.097)
0.146
(0.478)
MOUNT 0.007
(0.351)
0.006
(0.304)
0.005
(0.456)
0.006
(0.153)
0.008
(0.048)
0.009
(0.024)
0.007
(0.263)
0.006
(0.084)
NONCONT 1.264
(0.026)
1.510
(0.000)
1.305
(0.017)
0.913
(0.000)
0.847
(0.001)
0.752
(0.003)
1.265
(0.002)
0.699
(0.002)
DEM −0.247
(0.405)
0.312
(0.905)
−0.430
(0.173)
−0.168
(0.517)
−0.066
(0.795)
0.025
(0.919)
−0.137
(0.579)
0.100
(0.458)
CONST −1.772
(0.506)
−0.533
(0.802)
3.438
(0.282)
−0.972
(0.582)
−0.577
(0.712)
−0.270
(0.862)
− 5.685
(0.000)
Pseudo-R2 0.217 0.209 0.219 0.105 0.073 0.073 0.144 0.236
Est.method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit O.Logit OLS
D.var. PRCW PR25 PR1000 ON2 ON5 ON8 PR-INT ISC
Countries 131 131 131 131 131 131 131 129
Observations 1174 1174 1174 1174 1174 1174 1174 913
Notes: P-values are reported in brackets. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering have
been employed to compute z-statistics. O. Logit: ordered logit.
PR: PRIO (incidence), ON: ONSET, PR-INT: PRIO-INT (intensity)
We go in three directions. First, we use alternative thresholds for the number of
deaths. Recall that we worked with priocw, the intermediate intensity of conflict.
PRIO also provides data on low and high-intensity conflicts: prio25 and prio1000,
as defined in Section 3.
Second, we examine the notion of onset, instead of incidence. It might be argued
(see, e.g., Schneider and Wiesehomeier, 2006) that the factors that contribute to the
outbreak of a war do not coincide with the ones that keep feeding it. Moreover, once
the war has started, the probability that it continues is much higher than the one of
a war onset. Thus, it might appear unreasonable to fit a unique model that tries to
explain both onset and incidence, since these phenomena will probably have different
causes.
In our opinion, this distinction depends on taking the PRIO thresholds very seriously.
Before the threshold is crossed, we might have several manifestations of serious conflict
(a breakdown in negotiations, an insurgency, a crackdown), so that “onset” as defined
by the PRIO threshold is far from a sharp concept: it is arguably no different from a
year of “incidence”.
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That said, it is important to consider reasonable alternatives, and the “onset argu-
ment” is certainly one of them. We therefore introduce three new dependent variables:
onset2, onset5 and onset8. The variable onsetn switches on if there is intrastate
conflict in a particular year using the prio25 threshold of with more than 25 annual
battle deaths and n years since the last such crossing of the threshold.
The third direction concerns the binary nature of the conflict variable. Proposition
1 establishes a relationship between the three distributional parameters and the in-
tensity of conflict. This is imperfectly captured by a binary variable. To be able to
capture “intensity” in a more satisfactory manner we take two routes. First, we have
constructed a discrete variable (call it prio-int) that takes the values 0, 1, 2, and 3
if the country is below the threshold prio25, between prio25 and priocw, between
priocw and prio1000, or above prio1000, respectively. Our second route invokes
the continuous index of social conflict, isc, that is able to capture small-scale as well
as large-scale conflict.
Table 2 presents the results concerning these three directions of enquiry. To facilitate
comparison, column 1 reproduces the column 1 in Table 1 for priocw. Columns 2
and 3 employ the alternative PRIO thresholds, leading to the new binary variables
prio25 and prio1000. Columns 4–6 switch to the three new onset variables; the
regressions are otherwise identical. Finally, columns 7 and 8 report similar results for
the non-binary dependent variables prio-int and isc. (Ordered logit is used to obtain
column 7, while pooled OLS is employed in column 8.) Standard errors robust to
within-cluster correlation are employed in all cases.
As in the previous exercise, P invariably enters the regressions with a positive and
highly significant coefficient. F has a positive coefficient but it is not always significant:
it is so for prio25, onset2 and onset8. The coefficient on G/N is not significantly
different from zero in any of the regressions.
5.2. Other Linguistic Distances and Groups. There are different ways of defining
distances between languages. For instance, Dyen et al. (1992) use a lexico-statistical
analysis to estimate the distances between 95 Indo-European languages.33 Unfortu-
nately, we cannot use this data since distances are available only for Indo-European
languages. However, even within the space of fully-defined language trees, different
authors compute distances differently. As mentioned before, the distance between two
languages is defined as κij = 1−sδij, where δ ∈ [0, 1]. Fearon (2003) suggests the use of
δ = 0.5, which is the one that we’ve employed so far. Desmet et al. (2009) argue that
using lower values of δ give intuitively more plausible distances.34 In particular, they
33They focus on 200 basic meanings and compute for each pair of languages the proportion of
cognates, that is, the number of times that the two varieties have an unbroken history of descent from
a common ancestral form.
34To justify this claim, they provide the following example. Compare the following three language
pairs: Italian-Chinese, Italian-Greek and Italian-Spanish. Using δ = 0.5, the relative increase in
distance when going from Italian-Spanish to Italian-Greek is larger than when going from Italian-
Greek to Italian-Chinese. This apparently counterintuitive result no longer occurs with a δ = 0.05.
While we do not necessarily agree with this example, we provide it here for the reader’s assessment.
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use a value of δ = 0.05. To check that our results are robust to different values of δ
employed to compute language distances, we have recomputed P and G using different
values of δ.
Table 3 presents the output of reestimating the core specification with these new
indices. Column 1 reproduces the benchmark specification presented in Table 1, column
1, computed with δ = 0.5. Columns 2 and 3 present the estimates obtained with
δ = 0.05 and δ = 1 respectively. Finally, Desmet et al. (2009) use the information on
language compositions provided by Ethnologue at the highest level of disaggregation
level possible. Indeed, the main difference between Ethnologue and other data sources,
such as Fearon (2003), is disaggregated detail. For instance, in the case of Mexico,
Ethnologue reports 291 living languages. In contrast, the number of ethnic groups for
this country in Fearon’s dataset is four (Mestizo, Amerindian, White and Mayans).
As we’ve remarked, a fully disaggregated language grouping should not directly
correspond to the salient ethnic groups engaged in conflict. But it is also entirely
reasonable that the long shadow of history creates connections between the two sets
of groupings. As just two examples, consider the use of settler mortality in Acemoglu
et al. (2001) as a distant but important correlate of modern-day institutions, or the
use of British colonial land collection systems as an explanatory variable for crop
productivity in today’s India (Banerjee and Iyer, 2005). In both cases, while we fully
do not understand the pathways of influence, there is a connection. The advantages of
such a connection are obvious: in the main, they permit a more adequate defence of
exogeneity.
Similarly, while it is ludicrous to suggest that modern-day conflicts take place across
the language groups recorded in Ethnologue, it is reasonable to expect that such lan-
guage distinctions could form the basis of cultural and social distinctions. At the very
least, this option is worth examining as a variation. Therefore Column 4 in Table 3
presents the estimates obtained by directly using the indices elaborated by Desmet et
al. (2009), with language groupings at their full level of disaggregation. (As in their
paper, we use the value of δ = 0.05.)
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Table 3. Other variables of diversity
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
P 11.445
(0.001)
10.689
(0.001)
10.434
(0.003)
12.103
(0.001)
F 1.424
(0.071)
1.227
(0.123)
1.759
(0.024)
1.612
(0.022)
G/N −5.851
(0.110)
−4.498
(0.107)
−11.060
(0.108)
−4.756
(0.165)
LGDPC −0.575
(0.016)
−0.580
(0.009)
−0.520
(0.042)
−0.475
(0.029)
LPOP 0.184
(0.282)
0.195
(0.228)
0.160
(0.376)
0.290
(0.054)
OIL 0.708
(0.135)
0.762
(0.108)
0.662
(0.154)
0.683
(0.131)
MOUNT 0.007
(0.351)
0.008
(0.326)
0.009
(0.188)
0.013
(0.070)
NONCONT 1.264
(0.026)
1.234
(0.028)
1.248
(0.027)
0.932
(0.054)
DEM −0.247
(0.405)
−0.218
(0.463)
−0.331
(0.272)
−0.217
(0.435)
CONST −1.772
(0.506)
−1.915
(0.483)
−1.561
(0.535)
−4.271
(0.104)
Pseudo-R2 0.217 0.212 0.210 0.198
Est.method Logit Logit Logit Logit
Source FE (δ=0.50) FE (δ=1.00) FE (δ=0.05) DOW (δ=0.05)
Countries 131 131 131 134
Observations 1174 1174 1174 1201
Notes: The dependent variable is PRIOCW. P-values are reported in brackets.
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering have been employed to compute
z-statistics. Diversity variables source: FE - Fearon (2003), DOW - Desmet
et al. (2009).
In all cases, our results are qualitatively identical to what we obtained before: the
coefficient on P is invariably similar in sign and size and highly significant. F is
generally significant as well. Once again, G/N is never significant.
Now, the fact that computing distances with different values of δ for Fearon’s ethnic
groups has no effect on the results suggests that variations in the spread of inter-group
distances are not critical. It is far more remarkable that, in spite of the very different
group composition in Ethnologue and the Fearon database, our results survive intact.
Indeed, the direct correlation between the two polarization indices (computed from
Ethnologue and from Fearon) is quite high. For instance, when δ = 0.05 in both cases,
the correlation is equal to 0.70. However, the correlation between indices that do not
include distances is considerably smaller: for the R indices from the two databases, it is
equal to 0.34. This makes sense. Without a notion of distance, a further split of groups
will affect the measure greatly. With distances, the split is partly ameliorated by the
lower linguistic distances between the split groups. This pattern of correlation stresses
once more the importance of introducing distances in the computation of distributional
measures since they can resolve (in part) the group identification problem. It also
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possibly accounts for the similarities in the final estimates of the model when either
type of data is employed.
5.3. Other estimation strategies. In this section we consider different ways of es-
timating the conflict equation. Columns 2 and 3 in Table 4 display estimates obtained
by applying a random effects and a population-averaged estimators in a logit specifica-
tion. To facilitate the comparison, column 1 reports estimates obtained in the baseline
specification in Table 1. An implication of the theoretical model presented in Section 2
is that the coefficients of F , G/N , and P are country-specific. To account for this, we
have allowed for the possibility that the coefficients of each country are random draws
from a probability distribution, while those of the remaining variables are still consid-
ered to be fixed. Column 4 in Table 4 presents the estimated output, obtained in a
linear specification. The coefficients of the distributional indices should be interpreted
as the mean values of the corresponding random variables. The conclusions implied by
columns 2-4 are very similar: in all cases the coefficients of F and P are positive and
highly significant while that of G/N is not.35
Endogeneity in some of the controls is another aspect that is worrisome. In par-
ticular, it seems clear that GDP per capita can be endogenous in conflict regressions
(Miguel et al., 2004, Djankov and Reynal-Querol, 2010). As in Abadie (2006), we use
exogenous variation in landlock (the fraction of a country area distant to sea access)
as an instrumental variable for GDP per capita. The identification assumption is that
landlock does not cause conflict directly but it is related to conflict only through its
effect on income. Column 5 displays the corresponding estimates obtained by 2SLS
in a linear model.36 In this case, the coefficient of GDP per capita is very small and
insignificant, suggesting that the relation between income and conflict could be spu-
rious.37 However, the coefficient of P is still positive and significant at the 10% level
(its p-value is 0.07). The coefficients of F and G/N are not significant in this case.
Columns 6 and 7 use different frequencies for the definition of the variables. Fearon
(2005) has criticized the five-year interval used in most empirical studies after Collier
and Hoeffler arguing that, since conflict incidence or onset is measured at least annually,
the choice of five-year periods is completely arbitrary. We have reestimated our baseline
specification using annual data. To this effect, we have used the data in Fearon (2005).
Column 6 reports the corresponding estimates.38 Considering annual data does not
alter substantially our conclusions. The coefficients of F and P are slighly smaller
than in the five-year specification and the former is not significant. However, that of
P is still highly significant. Finally, column 7 presents estimates obtained in a cross
35Notice that the magnitudes of the coefficients of columns 2-3 and 4 are not directly comparable
since the former have been obtained in a logit specification while the latter, in a linear one.
36The IV-2SLS is typically preferred even when the dependent variable is dichotomous, (see Angrist
and Krueger, 2001 and Wooldridge, 2002).
37Similar conclusions have also been reached by Djankov and Reynal-Querol, 2008.
38The dependent variable is annual PRIOcw. Fearon’s sample runs from 1960 to 1999. Since annual
data on democracy is not available in this sample, its value in the first five-year period, 1960-1965,
has been used instead.
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sectional regression. In this case, the dependent variable is the average over the 1960-
2008 period of PRIOcw, while data on the variables that are not constant over time
are referred to 1960. An ordered logit has been employed to obtain the estimates.
Regarding the results, the coefficient of P is very similar to that obtained in the yearly
specification, positive and significant at the 5% level. In this case, that of F also turns
out to be significant while G/N is not.
Table 4. Other estimation methods
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
P 11.445
(0.001)
15.038
(0.025)
8.863
(0.008)
1.100
(0.015)
1.109
(0.071)
8.000
(0.007)
8.382
(0.049)
F 1.424
(0.071)
4.961
(0.005)
2.461
(0.003)
0.236
(0.005)
0.210
(0.342)
0.906
(0.181)
2.774
(0.010)
G/N −5.851
(0.110)
−6.357
(0.139)
−5.335
(0.118)
−0.103
(0.332)
0.000
(1.000)
0.000
(0.129)
2.487
(0.344)
LGDPC −0.575
(0.016)
−0.247
(0.408)
−0.168
(0.263)
−0.027
(0.097)
−0.014
(0.002)
−0.614
(0.031)
−0.712
(0.031)
LPOP 0.184
(0.282)
1.040
(0.001)
0.414
(0.009)
0.049
(0.000)
0.056
(0.001)
0.363
(0.001)
0.077
(0.736)
OIL 0.708
(0.135)
−0.185
(0.795)
0.042
(0.908)
0.041
(0.324)
0.071
(0.532)
0.530
(0.227)
1.344
(0.058)
MOUNT 0.007
(0.351)
0.021
(0.220)
0.006
(0.477)
0.001
(0.104)
0.002
(0.156)
0.006
(0.364)
0.022
(0.031)
NONCONT 1.264
(0.026)
1.199
(0.221)
0.787
(0.109)
0.146
(0.002)
0.128
(0.123)
1.034
(0.042)
1.124
(0.080)
DEM −0.247
(0.405)
−0.416
(0.232)
−0.230
(0.239)
−0.015
(0.539)
−0.066
(0.573)
−0.001
(0.998)
0.239
(0.670)
CONST −1.772
(0.506)
−22.227
(0.000)
−8.854
(0.002)
−0.622
(0.010)
−0.807
(0.557)
−1.770
(0.245)
−0.622
(0.010)
Pseudo-R2 0.217 - - - 0.167 0.160 0.132
Est.method Logit RE PA RC 2SLS Logit† O. Logit?
Countries 131 131 131 131 131 129 109
Observations 1174 1174 1174 1174 1174 4472 109
Notes: P-values are reported in brackets. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering
have been employed to compute z-statistics.RE: Random Effects; PA: pop-averaged;
RC: random coefficients; O. Logit: ordered logit. (†) Yearly data; (?) Cross-Section.
5.4. Robustness to Regional and Time Effects. Finally, we check whether the
results are driven by a particular set of countries that can be considered specially
conflictual. To do this, we introduce regional dummies for Asia, Latin America and
sub-Saharan Africa in the baseline specification. In addition, we simply eliminate
these regions (one at a time) from the sample and estimate the corresponding models.
Results are presented in Table 5.
Column 1 reproduces once again the benchmark model analyzed in Table 1. Column
2 shows that introducing regional dummies does not change the main results. In
Column 3, we eliminate Africa. Now F turns insignificant, and surprisingly, G/N
enters with a negative and significant coefficient. The removal of Asian countries
in Column 4 has no effect on the results. Similarly, the removal of Latin American
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countries from the sample yields a nonsignificant coefficient for F . In all cases, the
significance of P remains at the same levels. As a last robustness check, we have
introduced a time trend to check whether the existence of time effects can have any
impact on our results. This variable takes the values 1, 2, ...,10 for the first, second
and tenth periods in the sample. Results are presented in Column 6. Introducing a
time trend does not have much impact on either the magnitude of the coefficients or
their significance. Hence, similar conclusions as above also hold in this case.
Table 5. Robustness to regional and time effects
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
P 11.445
(0.001)
11.590
(0.003)
14.056
(0.003)
11.833
(0.001)
12.830
(0.002)
12.327
(0.001)
F 1.424
(0.071)
1.588
(0.159)
1.902
(0.184)
2.129
(0.029)
1.373
(0.096)
1.272
(0.130)
G/N* −5.851
(0.110)
−5.884
(0.118)
−2.040
(0.020)
−5.532
(0.197)
−4.913
(0.126)
−5.722
(0.109)
LGDPC −0.575
(0.016)
−0.625
(0.007)
−0.627
(0.015)
−0.534
(0.102)
−0.569
(0.022)
−0.621
(0.012)
LPOP 0.184
(0.282)
0.169
(0.249)
−0.038
(0.856)
0.131
(0.677)
0.232
(0.206)
0.144
(0.397)
OIL 0.708
(0.135)
0.697
(0.134)
0.772
(0.166)
0.708
(0.188)
1.188
(0.030)
0.602
(0.213)
MOUNT 0.007
(0.351)
0.008
(0.307)
−0.002
(0.891)
0.011
(0.290)
0.009
(0.201)
0.008
(0.312)
NONCONT 1.264
(0.026)
1.236
(0.032)
1.094
(0.092)
1.694
(0.006)
0.905
(0.156)
1.464
(0.014)
DEM −0.247
(0.405)
−0.189
(0.544)
−0.058
(0.876)
−0.307
(0.391)
−0.108
(0.757)
−0.424
(0.181)
CONST −1.772
(0.506)
−1.041
(0.785)
2.464
(0.518)
−1.782
(0.650)
−2.796
(0.316)
−1.578
(0.557)
Pseudo-R2 0.217 0.219 0.248 0.218 0.234 0.234
Est.method Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit
Regions/ Time no reg.dum. No Africa No Asia No L.Am. time trend
Countries 131 131 92 111 111 131
Observations 1174 1174 813 1002 975 1174
Notes: P-values are reported in brackets. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering
have been employed to compute z-statistics. * Coefficient is in millions.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we examine the link between ethnic divisions and social conflict. There
is a large empirical literature on this subject, that we summarize. We argue, as have
Esteban and Ray (1994, 1999) and Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005), that ethnic
polarization is likely to be an important correlate of conflict, rather than the widely
used measure of ethnic fractionalization. But the current paper goes significantly
beyond this particular argument.
Specifically, we rely on a recent theoretical framework by Esteban and Ray (2010) to
argue that conflict can be accurately proxied by a linear combination of polarization,
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fractionalization and the Gini coefficient, where the distances used in the first and last
measures correspond to the inter-group utility losses in public-goods conflict.
In Section 2, we state this result and explain just why these three indices come
into play. We simply note here that the use of distance-based measures is intimately
connected to conflict over public goods. With public goods, the payoff outcome to a
particular group is not binary. The identity of the winner matters to the loser, because
(barring very special cases) the mix of public goods implemented by different winners
will have different effects on the payoff of a particular loser. This is how the Gini and
polarization measures come into play. But the theory goes further: it allows us to
interpret the estimated coefficients on each of these measures in terms of the extent of
within-group cohesion (as opposed to free-riding) that is present in inter-group conflict.
Specifically, the impact of polarization is related to high levels of within-group cohesion.
The theory admits a very different interpretation for conflict over private goods.
Because private goods are divided up among the winners, the stronger sense of group
identity is counterbalanced by the smaller per-capita gains, and polarization measures
cease to matter. Fractionalization becomes the main variable that tracks the intensity
of such conflicts. But in private goods conflict, distances don’t matter: either the
winner gets the resources, or does not.39
The theoretical structure both disciplines our empirical research and allows for in-
terpretation of the estimated coefficients. In particular, the estimated coefficients are
informative (according to the theory) about the degree of free-riding versus group co-
hesion, as just discussed. But it is also informative about the degree of conflict that
can be attributed to a contest over public goods, versus the goal of seizing divisible
private goods. The former can be viewed as a struggle for political power or for cultural
or religious dominance, but it could be more than that. Economic outcomes, such as
control over entry into a trade or profession, or a housing locality, will also come under
the broad rubric of “public goods”. Indeed, so will natural resources, to the extent
that they are not consumed but used to finance the seizure or maintenance of political
power.
A central empirical task of this paper is to implement measures of the Gini and of
polarization that employ inter-group distances. We do so using linguistic differences
across groups, in the spirit of Fearon (2003) and Desmet et al. (2009). The choice of
linguistic distance is driven by the postulate that such distances are plausibly exogenous
to conflict, while at the same time they can be expected to drive — or at least influence
— antagonisms across groups. Our main identification assumption is that relative
linguistic distances across groups are a good proxy for the relative intensity of these
antagonisms.
The main result of this paper is that polarization — using linguistic distances —
has a large and highly significant impact on conflict across a number of different spec-
ifications. This result is robust to all sorts of different measures of conflicts (including
39As mentioned in the paper, different degrees of resentment about the winner of a private-goods
conflict can be formally modeled as a public-goods effect.
28
binary alternatives such as incidence and onset, as well as continuous indices), to al-
ternative ways of calculating language distances, to the choice of groups (as long as
language is principally used in defining them), and to the use of different regional dum-
mies or selections. The result is also robust to the inclusion of other measures of ethnic
diversity; certainly the fractionalization and the Gini, but also the binary-distance mea-
sure of polarization R introduced by Reynal-Querol (2002) and used in Montalvo and
Reynal-Querol (2005). This last measure is rendered insignificant once entered into
the same regressions along with the distance-sensitive measure of polarization.
The Gini index is also insignficant in most of the specifications, suggesting (along
the lines of the theory) that free-riding is not a huge factor in inter-group conflicts.
The importance of polarization tells us, in fact, that within-group cohesion is high in
conflict.
Finally, the Herfindahl-Hirschman fractionalization index is significant in many of
our specifications. Taken along with the results on polarization as well as the theory
on which we rely, this suggests that both public-goods and private-goods conflicts are
important, though the overwhelming dominance of polarization indicates that public-
goods conflict forms the major component of social tensions.
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Appendix
Variables and Weights Used to Compute isc by CNTS. The eight variables
included by the CNTS and their weights (in square brackets) are40:
• Assassinations (domestic1) [25]: Any politically motivated murder or attempted
murder of a high government official or politician.
• General Strikes (domestic2) [20]: Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or
service workers that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at
national government policies or authority.
• Guerrilla Warfare (domestic3) [100]: Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings
carried on by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at
the overthrow of the present regime.
• Major Government Crises (domestic4) [20]: Any rapidly developing situation
that threatens to bring the downfall of the present regime - excluding situations
of revolt aimed at such overthrow.
• Purges (domestic5) [20]: Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of
political opposition within the ranks of the regime or the opposition.
• Riots (domestic6) [25]: Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100
citizens involving the use of physical force.
• Revolutions (domestic7) [150]: Any illegal or forced change in the top govern-
ment elite, any attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful
armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government.
• Anti-government Demonstrations (domestic8) [10]: Any peaceful public gath-
ering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing
their opposition to government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations
of a distinctly anti-foreign nature.
The calculation of the isc is performed as follows: weighted sum of occurrences of
each event divided by the number of types of variables, 8, and multiplied by 100.
40For more information, see Banks (2008).
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Variables Used in the Empirical Exercises. We summarize the variables used in
our empirical exercises and their sources in the following Table.
Table A1. Independent Variables
Variable Source Definition
Diversity measures
- F FE, DOW index of fractionalization
- R FE, DOW index of polarization - Reynal-Querol (2002)
- P FE, DOW index of polarization - Esteban & Ray (1994)
- G FE, DOW Gini coefficient
Sociopolitical variables
- LPOP MAD, CNTS log of population (for countries not present in MAD,
CNTS is used)
- DEM Polity IV dummy if democracy score from Policy IV (1-10) is equal
or higher than 4
Economic variables
- LGDPC MAD log of GDP per capita (in international 1990 dollars)
- OIL FL dummy variable for more than 33% of export revenues from oil
(if country not present in FL, various internet sources are used)
Geography
- MOUNT FL % of the mountainious terrain
- NONCONT FL dummy variable for noncontiguous states
Notes: DOW - Desmet et al. (2009), FE - Fearon (2003), FL - Fearon and Laitin (2003),
MAD - Maddison (2008);
